Most-Favored-Nation Drug Pricing: What It Means for U.S. Patients—and What Happens Next

Introduction

On May 12, President Trump signed an executive order pledging that American patients will pay no more than the most-favored-nation (MFN) price—the lowest price a drug receives in any comparably developed country. The order is underpinned by strong language, asserting the U.S. "funds around three quarters of global pharmaceutical profits" and describing the current situation as an "egregious imbalance" resulting from a "purposeful scheme" by manufacturers. It frames high U.S. prices as an "abuse of Americans' generosity," who "unwittingly sponsor both drug manufacturers and other countries". The order sets a 30-day fuse for manufacturers to match those foreign benchmarks before the administration moves to more coercive tools. MFN pricing could reshape negotiations, margins, and patient affordability within weeks, not years. This primer unpacks how MFN works, why the next month matters, and what every stakeholder should be doing now.

What Is MFN Pricing?

Under an MFN rule, U.S. prices become anchored to the lowest price observed in peer nations. The concept is simple—but the details are not:

• ●Reference basket. The order refers to "comparably developed nations," but leaves basket definition to HHS. The choice of these nations is critical, as it will directly determine the MFN price targets and the extent of required U.S. price reductions.
• ●Price type. Foreign net prices (after statutory discounts) can be far below U.S. list prices—especially for high-spend specialties.
• ●Timing. Within 30 days HHS will transmit MFN targets to every manufacturer, kicking off an initial response window.

The Executive Order's Ultimatum: A Critical 30-Day Timeline

The EO establishes a clear sequence of events with significant potential consequences:

Initial Action (Within 30 Days - by June 11): The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is directed to communicate MFN price targets to pharmaceutical manufacturers. This marks the start of a crucial period for industry response.

Potential Escalation (After 30 Days - Post June 11): If HHS determines that "significant progress" towards MFN pricing has not been achieved, the EO mandates the consideration or initiation of several potent administrative actions. These include:

• ●Proposing rulemaking to formally impose MFN pricing.
• ●Considering certification for drug importation from lower-cost developed nations.
• ●Directing the Attorney General and Federal Trade Commission to undertake antitrust enforcement against anti-competitive practices.
• ●Tasking the Department of Commerce to review and potentially act on export controls for drugs or their precursors.
• ●Instructing the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to review and potentially modify or revoke drug approvals for products deemed unsafe, ineffective, or improperly marketed.
• ●Directing other agencies to take "all action available" to address what the EO terms "global freeloading."

Behind the scenes, CMS will be tracking wholesale acquisition cost (WAC) updates, Part D bid revisions, and direct-to-consumer offers to gauge compliance.

How Big Are Today's Price Gaps?

Significant disparities exist between U.S. list prices and those in other developed nations for many key medicines. RxEconomics is conducting ongoing research into these price differentials and will be publishing detailed comparisons on our website. The introduction of MFN pricing in the U.S. could trigger complex reactions in the global market. For instance, manufacturers might become more resistant to offering deep discounts abroad to avoid setting lower U.S. benchmarks, potentially altering global launch strategies or access. Conversely, the EO also directs U.S. officials to address foreign policies that suppress prices, adding another layer of potential international dynamic shifts.

Potential Impact on Drug Spend & Innovation

The potential financial effects of MFN pricing are multifaceted. The Congressional Budget Office has previously estimated that similar international reference pricing approaches could reduce U.S. brand-name drug spending, potentially substantially. Initial investor reactions were mixed, reflecting uncertainty about how potential savings or revenue shifts might be distributed across manufacturers, PBMs, and payers.

The EO directly confronts traditional arguments about R&D funding, framing high U.S. prices as an unfair subsidy for global innovation. The administration's stated position is that this financial burden should not fall disproportionately on U.S. patients. While concerns about the potential impact on future R&D investment levels remain a key point of discussion, underlying patient needs and demand for innovative treatments in significant therapeutic areas continue to be major drivers of the global pharmaceutical market.

It's important to note that the EO outlines a strategy extending beyond direct price controls. Section 3 directs the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative to take action against foreign countries whose policies might unduly "suppress the price of pharmaceutical products". Additionally, Section 4 tasks HHS with actively facilitating direct-to-consumer (DTC) purchasing programs for manufacturers who offer MFN prices, potentially fostering new sales channels that operate outside traditional intermediary structures.

Four Possible Paths Over the Next 30 Days

The critical trigger for escalation is whether HHS deems "significant progress" has been made by manufacturers within the 30-day window. The EO does not define this term, granting HHS considerable discretion and creating uncertainty.

• ●Full Compliance. Makers cut list prices or expand coupons to hit MFN targets. CMS claims victory; formal rulemaking stalls.
• ●Partial Compliance. Select high-profile or high-expenditure drugs see price adjustments, others hold firm—triggering a narrower MFN rule.
• ●Stalemate. Token cuts + DTC cash programs leave average prices far above MFN. HHS moves to the full range of escalatory actions outlined in Section 5(b) of the EO, including importation, antitrust escalation, potential export controls on drugs or precursors, and the unprecedented step of reviewing and possibly revoking FDA drug approvals.
• ●Litigation Blitz. Industry sues on constitutional and statutory grounds, seeking injunctions; implementation dates slip into 2026, despite the EO's attempt to limit legal recourse.

What Stakeholders Should Do Now

The compressed 30-day timeline demands immediate and intensive scenario planning.

Manufacturers

• ●Build gross-to-net MFN models for top products; identify SKUs with the steepest foreign gap.
• ●Draft DTC cash-pay pathways to bypass PBMs and accelerate pass-through savings, potentially with HHS facilitation.
• ●Urgently assess contingency plans for the most severe Section 5(b) threats, including potential export controls affecting supply chains and the risk to FDA approvals for non-compliant products.

Payers & PBMs

• ●Quantify potential savings by therapeutic class and ready contingency formularies.
• ●Re-price value-based contracts that rely on list-price inflation rebates.
• ●Consider the strategic implications if government-facilitated DTC channels gain significant traction.

State Medicaid & 340B Entities

• ●Prepare for revised rebate invoicing if nominal prices fall.
• ●Evaluate importation pilot authority under FD&C §804 once HHS certifies safety.
• ●Be aware of potential market access disruptions if export controls or FDA actions affect drug availability.

Investors

• ●Track manufacturer 8-K disclosures on price actions; watch segments with significant U.S. price differentials where net prices could be most affected.

Key Metrics to Watch

• ●Number of MFN price matches filed with HHS (publicly reported aggregate).
• ●WAC changes in First Databank/Medispan for top drugs, alongside scrutiny of manufacturer DTC list prices advertised on cash-pay portals to understand true pricing strategies.
• ●Prescription volume trends for key drug categories—watch for near-term volatility as patients and providers assess the changing landscape.
• ●HHS's definition of the "comparably developed nations" reference basket.
• ●Announcements from the Department of Commerce or USTR regarding actions against foreign pricing practices.
• ●Filings of any litigation challenging the EO.
• ●The official HHS determination on whether "significant progress" has been achieved after the 30-day period.

Conclusion

The MFN order compresses years of pricing debate into a 30-day sprint. Whether the industry defuses the threat voluntarily—or forces a regulatory showdown involving unprecedented measures like linking FDA approvals to pricing or imposing export controls —depends on actions taken now. This EO signals a potential inflection point, fundamentally challenging the U.S. pharmaceutical market's established role in funding global R&D and indicating a heightened willingness by the government to employ aggressive interventions. Stakeholders that model scenarios, adjust contracts, and communicate proactively will be best positioned for whichever path unfolds. For bespoke MFN impact analyses or media commentary, contact RxEconomics at contact@rxeconomics.com.